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DRAFTING OF PLAYER CONTRACTS
& CLAUSES
MARTIN J. GREENBERG*
I. "INTRODUCTION
Did you ever say something that you really didn't mean? Did you
ever write something that you did not mean to write?
Sports contracts deserve the same precision of draftsmanship as any
other legal document. When drafting sports contracts our goal as law-
yers should be precision in expression, conferring a singular meaning.
The document should be clear on its face so that it is not subject to third-
party intervention. In essence, when drafting sports contracts, we should
adopt the principle of S.U.C.S. (Simplicity - Understanding - Clarity -
Standardization) or K.I.S.S. (Keep it Simple Stupid.)
As lawyers, we need to eliminate from our drafting the legalese, the
parody of our legal prose, and the antiquity of verse derived from our
English ancestry. We could start with the elimination of such words and
phrases as "notwithstanding," "provided that," "without limitation," and
"as hereinafter provided"; just to name a few.
One of my favorite examples of lawyers making the simple incredibly
complex is Joe Market's desire to sell to John Smith one (1) orange for
$1. Give it to a lawyer and it may sound something like this:
Know all men by these presents, that Joe's Market, a Michigan
corporation ("Seller"), in consideration of one dollar and other
good and valuable considerations paid by John Smith ("Pur-
chaser"), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does
hereby grant, sell, assign, transfer and deliver unto Purchaser, its
successors and assigns, to have and to hold unto Purchaser, its
successors and assigns forever, one orange, together with all its
rinds, skin, juice, pulp and pits and with all right and advantages
therein, with full power to bite, cut, suck and otherwise to eat the
same; and Seller hereby covenants with Purchaser that Seller is
the true and lawful owner of the said goods and chattels; that
they are free from all encumbrances and security interests; that
Seller has good right to sell the same as aforesaid; and that Seller
will warrant and defend the same against the lawful claims and
* Partner, Deutsch & Greenberg, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Director, National Sports Law
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demands of all persons, anything hereinbefore or hereinafter or in
any other means of whatever nature or kind whatsoever to the
contrary in any wise notwithstanding.'
II. DisPmuT RESOLUTION
Contracts that don't adhere to the principles of S.U.C.S. will land the
draftsman, player, and team in dispute resolution. Such dispute resolu-
tion procedures relative to contract interpretation in professional sports
are dictated by the particular sport's Collective Bargaining Agreement
and Uniform Player Contract.
For example, Article IX, Section 1 of the National Football League's
(NFL) Collective Bargaining Agreement defines an arbitrable non-in-
jury grievance as:
Any dispute (hereinafter referred to as a "grievance") arising af-
ter the execution of this Agreement and involving the interpreta-
tion or application of, or compliance with, any provision of this
Agreement, the NFL Player Contract, or any applicable provision
of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws pertaining to terms and con-
ditions of employment of NFL players, will be resolved exclu-
sively in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Article,
except wherever another method of dispute resolution is set.forth
elsewhere in this Agreement, and except wherever the Settlement
Agreement provides that the Special Master, Impartial Arbitra-
tor, the Federal District Court or the Accountants shall resolve a
dispute.2
Another example is contained in the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment of the National Basketball Association (NBA). Disputes will be
arbitrable under the league's grievance-arbitration procedure if they
involve:
the interpretation or application of, or compliance with, the pro-
visions of this Agreement or the provisions of a Player Contract
(except as provided in paragraph 9 of a Uniform Player Con-
tract), including a dispute concerning the validity of a Player Con-
tract... however... disputes arising under Articles IV, V, VI,
VII, VIII, IX, X, and XII shall be determined by the Special
Master provided for in Article XIV of the Stipulation and Settle-
1. CARL FELSENFELT and ALAN SIEGEL, WRITTING CONTRACmS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 1
(1981).
2. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLEcrIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Art. 9, § 1
(1982).
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ment Agreement, except where the Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement expressly provide otherwise.3
A final example is contained in the Basic Agreement of Major
League Baseball (MLB). A dispute will be arbitrable under the league's
grievance system if it:
involves the existence or interpretation of, or compliance with,
any agreement, or any provision of any agreement, between the
Association and the Club or any of them or between a Player and
a Club, except that disputes related to the following agreements
between the Association and the Clubs shall not be subject to the
Grievance Procedure set forth herein: (i) The Major League
Baseball Players Benefit Plan; (ii) The Agreement Regarding Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Benefit Plan; (iii) The Agreement
regarding dues check-off.4
The NFL, MLB, and NBA Uniform Player Contracts all contain a
provision recognizing the arbitration provisions that are contained in
their respective Collective Bargaining Agreements.
For example, the National Football League Uniform Player Contract,
in Paragraph 19, states that during the term of any Collective Bargaining
Agreement, any dispute between player and club involving the interpre-
tation or application of any provision of this contract will be submitted
to final and binding arbitration in accordance with the procedure called
for in any Collective Bargaining Agreement in existence at the time the
event giving rise to any such dispute occurs.5
As another example, the National Basketball Association Uniform
Player Contract, in Paragraph 21, states that in the event of any dispute
arising between the player and the club relating to any matter arising
under this Contract, or concerning the performance or interpretation
thereof (except for a dispute arising under Paragraph 9 hereof) such dis-
pute shall be resolved in accordance with the grievance and arbitration
procedures set forth in the Agreement currently in effect between the
National Basketball Association and the National Basketball Associa-
tion Players Association (hereinafter NBPA.) 6
As a further example, Section 9(b) of the Major League Baseball
Uniform Player Contract states that all disputes between the player and
3. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Art.
28, § 1 (1988).
4. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BASIC AGREEMENT, Art. 11, § A (1)(a) (1990-1993).
5. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, Par. 19 (1982).
6. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT, Par. 21 (1988).
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the club are required to be resolved in accordance with the grievance
procedures outlined in Article 11 of the Basic Agreement.7
When disputes are brought to arbitration, an arbitrator then ap-
pointed, pursuant to the provisions of the particular Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement, will be charged with determining questioned or
ambiguous contract language. However, it is not necessary for the, arbi-
trator to engage in language interpretation unless the language of the
agreement is ambiguous. Where the language is clear, it is the responsi-
bility of the arbitrator to simply enforce such language even though the
results could be harsh.
"An agreement is not ambiguous if the arbitrator can determine its
meaning without any other guide than a knowledge of the simple facts
on which, from the nature of language in general, its meaning depends."8
Rather, an ambiguity occurs when "plausible contentions may be made
for conflicting interpretations."9 The cardinal rule of arbitration in these
instances is that the interpreter must ascertain and give effect to the mu-
tual intent of the parties. To determine the intent of the parties, the in-
quiry should be made as to what the language meant to the parties at the
time the agreement was written. This meaning is controlling.10
In his efforts to discover the mutual intent of the parties, the arbitra-
tor is guided by several rules of interpretation: (1) give effect to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and, whenever two interpretations are
possible, one making the agreement unlawful and the other making it
valid, the latter should control; (2) use normal and customary usage in
interpreting words; (3) view the agreement as a whole (integration of
documents); (4) avoid harsh, absurd or nonsensical results; (5) remem-
ber the principle that expressly stating something is to exclude some-
thing else; (6) allow specific language to govern over general language;
(7) consider the custom and past practice of the parties; (8) consider the
industry practice and standards; (9) interpret against the party selecting
the language (the draftsmen's rule); and (10) permit the writing to gov-
ern where conflict exists between pre-printed words and written words.1
Each League has a "check-off" procedure wherein the Commis-
sioner or League President has the right to veto or disapprove a player's
contract.
7. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL UNIFORM PLAYER CoNTRACr, § 9b (1990-1993).
8. FRANK AND EDNA FELKOURI, How ARBIrRATIoN WORKS 342 (1985).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 343.
11. Id. at 342-365.
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, For instance, Paragraph 18 of the National Football League Uniform
Player Contract provides:
FILING. This contract will be valid and binding upon Player and
Club immediately upon execution. A copy of this contract, in-
cluding any attachment to it, will be filed by Club with the League
Commissioner within 10 days after execution. The Commissioner
will have the right to disapprove this contract on reasonable
grounds, including but not limited to an attempt by the parties to
abridge or impair the rights of any other club, uncertainty or in-
completeness in expression of the parties' respective rights and
obligations, or conflict between the terms of this contract and any
collective bargaining agreement then in existence. Approval will
be automatic unless, within 10 days after receipt of this contact in
his office, the Commissioner notifies the parties either of disap-
proval or of extension of this 10-day period for purposes of inves-
tigation or clarification pending his decision. On the receipt of
notice of disapproval and termination, both parties will be re-
lieved of their respective rights and obligations under this
contract.
12
In baseball, upon the execution of a Uniform Player Contract by the
Club and Player, the Club, pursuant to Article 4 of the Basic Agreement,
is required to promptly submit the contract, in duplicate, to the appro-
priate League President for approval. Within twenty (20) days after re-
ceipt of the contract, the League President is required to approve or
disapprove the contract. In the event that the contract is not approved,
the League President is required to provide the Association with a writ-
ten explanation of his reasons for disapproving the contract. 3
Similarly, in basketball upon the execution of the contract, the Club
and Player are required to file a copy of the contract with the Commis-
sioner for approval purposes, pursuant to Paragraph 14 of the Uniform
Player Contract. After the filing, the Commissioner has ten (10) days in
which to disapprove the contract as being in violation of the NBA Con-
stitution or By-Laws. If disapproved, the Contract is then deemed to be
terminated and of no further force or effect.
14
A good example of a contract that was disapproved by a Commis-
sioner is the contract that Chris Dudley entered into on August 5, 1993,
with the Portland Trail Blazers. The contract is for seven (7) years, total-
ing approximately $10.5 million in compensation. For the first year of
12. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE UNIFORM PLAYER CoNTRACr, Par. 18.
13. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BASIC AGREEMENT, Art. 4.
14. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM PLAYER CoNTRAcr, Par. 14.
1993]
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the contract, Dudley's compensation is $790,000, i.e., the salary cap slot
that Dudley filled. While the $790,000 is less than the $1.2 million Dud-
ley made the previous season with the New Jersey Nets, the deal was
attractive to Dudley because the contract contained an opt-out escape
clause (or early termination provision) that permitted him to become a
free-agent after the first year of play. The attractiveness was that under
the National Basketball Association's current salary cap, teams can re-
sign their free-agents without regard to the salary cap.15
After reviewing the contract, Commissioner David Stern labeled it a
"blatant" and "transparent" attempt to circumvent the salary cap.' 6 The
NBA position rested on a clause in the league's Collective Bargaining
Agreement that prohibits ". . .any terms that are designed to serve the
purpose of defeating or circumventing such agreement.. ."17 Dudley ap-
pealed the decision and both Special Master, Merrill Clark, and Arbitra-
tor, Daniel Collins, upheld the contract.' 8 The rulings were then
appealed to U.S. District Judge Dickenson R. Debevoise. On October
27, 1993, Debevoise upheld the contract even though one year out provi-
sions in multi-year contracts might "have presently unascertainable ad-
verse effect on the very legitimate object of the salary cap."'19 However,
Debevoise concluded that Dudley's contract does not violate the provi-
sions of the National Basketball Association's Collective Bargaining
Agreement.20
Another example of a Commissioner voiding a contract between a
club and a player involved Rick Mirer's contract with the Seattle
Seahawks. On August 13, 1993, National Football League Commis-
sioner Paul Tagliabue called the contract "a sham" that violates the
15. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Art.
VII, Part F.
16. Cap in Hand, NBA Seeks Solutions, THm WASHINGTON POST, November 9, 1993, at
El.
17. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Art.
VII, Part H.
18. Arbitrator's Ruling Helps Green, Los ANGELES TIMES, September 10, 1993, at C2;
Arbitrator Says He'll Approve Dudley Pact, UPI, September 9, 1993, BC Cycle; VALID, USA
TODAY, September 10, 1993, at 10.
19. Judge Sides With Dudley/League Loses In Flap About Blazer's Deal, USA TODAY,
October 28, 1993, at 6C.
20. Judge OKs Blazer Pact With Dudley, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIBUNE, October 28, 1993,
at D-2; Dudley's Contract Validated By Court, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, October 28, 1993, at
D10; Judge Upholds Dudley Contract With Blazers, UPI, Sports News, October 27, 1993, BC
Cycle; Trail Blazing in Salary Cap Evasion, THE FINANCIAL POST, November 11, 1993, at 47;
Judge Upholds Deal of Blazers Dudley, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTrrUTION, October
28, 1993, at E3; Judge Rulings on Dudley Contract Gives Player Victory on Two Points, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, October 31, 1993, at 3B.
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league's new labor agreement. Mirer's contract is worth approximately
$7.6 million for the first three (3) years, and if he chooses to exercise the
options for the fourth and fifth years, the five (5) year deal is worth
approximately $15.6 million. Mirer's base salary in the first three (3)
years of the contract is guaranteed. While the contract did not contain a
signing bonus, Mirer reportedly was to earn a one-time bonus of
$3,007,500 if he or the team met any one of a number of goals. Some of
the easiest incentives to achieve in the contract were ones that could be
achieved by the team, even if Mirer was injured or not playing, such as;
winning three (3) games in a season, ranking higher than 28th on of-
fense, giving up fewer sacks than in 1992, and allowing fewer intercep-
tions than in 1992. The contract provided that if none of the criteria
were met in 1993, they would carry over to the 1994 and 1995 seasons.
Mirer's first year salary of $1.24 million represents all of the money that
the Seahawks had remaining from their rookie salary pool limitation of
$2.36 million. 21
Commissioner Tagliabue thought that the incentive bonus provision
was a loop-hole in the rookie salary cap, in that, if the incentives were
reached during the 1993 season, the bonuses would not count in deter-
mining the salary cap for 1994. Tagliabue also noted that the contract
included no signing bonus, although it commits Mirer to five (5) seasons.
Salary bonuses under the new National Football League Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement are pro-rated over the term of the contract and
count against the salary cap. Mirer has the right to cancel the contract,
by the use of a voidable clause, for the 1996 and 1997 season if he earns
the incentives. Seattle has the right to buy back those two (2) remaining
years effected by the voidable clause by paying Mirer $3,335,000. Fur-
thermore, Tagliabue said that the contract included a series of incentives
that are certain to be reached, including 59 contingencies that do not
require Mirer to play one down. These incentives are the functional
equivalent of a signing bonus that put the Seahawks over their rookie
pool allocation.2a
The Mirer contract was scheduled to be arbitrated before Federal
Judge David Doty in Minneapolis on September 7, 1993. However, on
November 3, 1993, the League and the National Football League
21. Tagliabue Voids Mirer Pact, THE BOSTON GLOBE, August 14, 1993, at 66; NFL Rejects
Mirer Contract, Setting Arbitration Fight, SPORTS INDUSTRY NEws, August 20, 1993, at 325.
22. NFL Commissioner Combs Hawks' Contract with Mirer, THE SEATTLE TIMES, August
11, 1993, AT Cl; NFL Rejects Mirer Contract, Setting Arbitration Fight, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY
NEws, August 20, 1993, at 325; Add Mirer's Contract Clash Court-Bound, USA TODAY, August
27, 1993, at 6C.
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Player's Association reached a settlement agreement relative to the
Mirer contract. With respect to Mirer, the settlement requires that the
bonus clause count on a pro-rated basis toward the salary cap that kicks
in for the 1994 season. In other words, if Mirer earned the bonus during
the 1993 season, approximately $600,000 of his earned bonus would
count against Seattle's salary cap in each of the next four (4) seasons. In
essence, the settlement agreement makes Seattle treat the incentive
clause as though it were a signing bonus for purposes of future salary
caps, but not for purposes of this season's Rookie Pool. Mirer has al-
ready earned the bonuses for this season and, as a result, he has earned
the option to void the last two (2) years of his contract. The Seahawks
can reinstate those years by paying Mirer $3.335 million, half of which
would count toward their salary cap in 1996, the other half in 1997. The
net result of the pro-rating of the incentive bonus will be to deprive Seat-
tle of the chance of signing a $1.5 million player each of the next four (4)
seasons. 2
After review of numerous bonus provisions and sports contracts,
what follows are typical problems in team-player contracts.
1. Shorthand Style - Use of Non-Definitional Words - Often, words
that are peculiar to the sports industry are employed. Non-definitional
in themselves possessing different definitions depending upon the con-
text of their use. Such words might include; "cut, .... league year," "active
list," "salary guarantee," "season," "roster," and "plays."
2. The Use of Excessive Legal Verbiage and the Absence of Specific-
ity - Legal verse and prose lead to drafting confusion and excessive ver-
biage. It is essential that any condition precedent or condition
subsequenf be stated with specificity, providing for the time, and upon
which events, the condition will be met or will fail.
3. Failure to State with Specificity the Rating or Assessment System
that Will Earn the Player the Bonus - For example, in the bonus clause
"...player will receive $25,000 if he leads the League in pass recep-
tions.. .," does this bonus clause mean that the player will earn the bo-
nus if he leads the league in the number of passes caught, or if he leads
the league in the average yards per reception, or if he leads the league in
total yardage as a result of a total number of receptions caught?
23. Seahawks" Mirer Relived After Contract Gets League O.K., NFL Player's Association
Solve Dispute, THE VANCOUVER SUN, September 4, 1993, at H2; Incentive Guideline Set As A
Result of Rookie Deals, USA TODAY, September 8, 1993, at 9C; Seattle Seahawks, THE SPORT-
mo NEWS, September 13, 1993, at 42.
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4. Awarding of Bonuses that Are Subject to Ambiguous or Nonexis-
tent Statistical Achievements - Such as the number of tackles (assisted or
unassisted), or quarterback ratings.
5. Failure to State whether the Bonuses, Regardless if within a Per-
formance or Honors Bonus Category, Are Cumulative or Noncumulative.
6. In the Case of Honor Bonuses, a Failure to State which Reporting
Agency Qualifies the Player for the Bonus - Such as Associated Press,
United Press International, Newspaper Enterprise Association, Sporting
News, Pro Football Weekly, USA Today and Pro Football Digest to
name a few.
7. Failure to State whether the Particular Bonus Provision Is Subject
to a Qualifring Standard - For example, Player is to receive a bonus of
$25,000 if he leads the league in kick-off returns. Player may have one
kick-off return and lead the league, but what is intended is that the
player have a minimum number of kick-off returns in order to qualify for
the bonus.
8. Failure to State what Happens to the Contract Provision in the
Event that the Player is Traded or Assigned.
9. Failure to State which Records Will Constitute the Official Records
to Determine Achievement of a Performance Bonus, Such as Conference,
League, or Team Records.
10. Failure to State What Effect, if Any, Injuries May Have upon the
Player's Opportunity to Either Achieve or Earn Bonuses.
I have drafted several clauses that appear clear and simple enough on
their face, but they are subject to interpretation and ultimately could
result in a dispute. Some of those clauses are provided below. Follow-
ing the clauses are analyses of the draftsmanship and, in some cases, ar-
bitration and court decisions that discuss the subject clause:
A. ESCALATOR CLAUSE - In the event Player is selected to the
Pro Bowl following the 1992 NFL regular season, Player's salary shall be
adjusted to the average salary of the twelve (12) linebackers that are
selected to the Pro Bowl.
POTENTIAL DISPUTES
1. When is the bonus paid and who certifies as to the calculation for
determination of the adjusted pay?
2. Does the player receive the adjustment if he is chosen as an alter-
nate to the Pro Bowl or only if chosen to the initial balloting?
3. Does the word "salary" pertain only to base salary pursuant to
Paragraph 5 of the National Football League's Uniform Player Contract,
1993]
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or does it mean the player's total compensation package which might not
include base salary; plus bonuses earned, plus deferred compensation,
plus miscellaneous compensation (such as tickets, accommodations,
automobile)?
4. What does the use of the term "average" mean and how is aver-
age calculated? Does it mean the total base salary of the affected line-
backers, divided by the total number of linebackers affected?
5. Should the language contain both a bottom-out and cap provi-
sion? What happens if the average of the twelve (12) linebackers sala-
ries is less than the salary currently being received by the player? If the
average base salary of the twelve (12) linebackers is more than the base
salary of the affected player, is there a cap amount that the player will be
paid by virtue of the bonus provision?
B. TERMINATION CLAUSE - The University shall have the right
to terminate this Employment Agreement at any time if the head coach
commits an act of moral turpitude or if the head coach engages in con-
duct seriously prejudicial to the best interests of the University or its
Athletic Program.
POTENTIAL DISPUTES
1. The terms "moral turpitude" and "seriously prejudicial to the
best interests of the University or Athletic program" are non-defini-
tional terms. With respect to one coach's contract negotiation, it took
approximately two (2) years to define those terms. With respect to the
word "moral turpitude," some of the activities that were attempted to be
defined as constituting moral turpitude included:
a. Urinating on a street.
b. Intercourse with a female student.
c. Use of profanity.
d. Display of sexually explicit pictures on office walls.
e. Solicitation of a prostitute.
f. Deceit.
2. If the coach commits an act of moral turpitude or an act that is
seriously prejudicial or not in the best interests of the University, does
the coach's compensation cease or does he continue to get paid?
C. GUARANTEE - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary,
player's contract shall be deemed to be a guaranteed no-cut contract.
[Vol. "4:51
DRAFTING OF PLAYER CONTRACTS & CLAUSES
POTENTIAL DISPUTES
1. Does guarantee as used herein mean that the player will get paid
for the unexpired term of his contract even though the contract is
terminated?
2. What events trigger the guarantee, i.e., lack of skill, personal con-
duct, death, disability, unfitness to play, re-injury of preexisting injury or
engagement in ultrahazardous activities?
3. Does the use of the term "no-cut" constitute a different concept
than "guarantee" by permitting the player to remain on the roster in
addition to getting paid?
In the arbitration of John S. Vallely, the issue was a clause in a rider
attached to the Uniform Player Contract stipulating in part that Vallely
accepts employment on a no-cut guaranteed basis. In May 1970, Vallely
executed a three-season contract with the Atlanta Hawks. After one
and a quarter seasons, Vallely was traded to the Houston Rockets. In
September 1972, Houston released Vallely from the team's roster, but
continued to pay his salary pursuant to the contract. Vallely's presence
on the team roster would have qualified him automatically for the
league's pension plan. The NBPA argued that the team could not obvi-
ate its responsibilities to a player under a no-cut contract by simply re-
moving the player from the team's roster. In the arbitrator's opinion, a
no-cut provision essentially assures the player that the club cannot cut
him from the team so long as' he has not breached the contract. The
arbitrator determined that Vallely should have been on the roster and
the active list of the club for the three seasons stipulated in the contract.
As a result, he would have been eligible to participate in the pension
plan.24
Another illustration of a dispute over a guarantee clause can be
found in the arbitration decision involving Dan Pastorini. At issue was
whether the Oakland/Los Angeles Raiders Football Club was entitled to
an offset against a guaranteed salary obligation to Pastorini, specifically
the amounts Pastorini received from other NFL teams after the Raiders
released him in September of 1981. Pastorini had a guaranteed salary
clause with the Raiders for the 1980 through 1983 seasons. In 1981, the
Raiders waived Pastorini under Paragraph 11 of the National Football
League's Uniform Player Contract, which cites unsatisfactory skill or
performance. Later that year, Pastorini signed with the Los Angeles
24. In re: National Basketball Association (Houston Rockets) v. National Basketball
Player's Association (John S. Vallely) (1974) (Seitz, Arb.).
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Rams. He then played for the Philadelphia Eagles during the 1982 and
1983 seasons. The Raiders took the position that once Pastorini signed
with the Rams, the Raiders were no longer liable for Pastorini's guaran-
teed salary. The Raiders argued that Pastorini had a duty to mitigate
damages as an offset to the terminated guarantee clause in his contract.
The court ruled that damages were not applicable because there was no
wrongful termination of the contract. While the Raiders had a right to
discharge Pastorini, they also had an obligation to pay him the salary
specified in the contract. Finally, the court ruled that, while it may be
league policy to offset the obligation of the club waiving a player with
the salary paid by the club picking up the player, in Pastorini's case, the
contract did not provide for such an offset. Thus, the Raiders were held
liable for Pastorini's guaranteed salary.25
D. DEFERRED COMPENSATION - The balance of the salary to
which Player is entitled under the National Basketball Association's
Uniform Player Contract, Paragraph 1, which contract is for the 1977-78
season, shall be deferred until June 15, 1984, over a twelve (12) year
period in equal monthly installments beginning with the first of said pay-
ments on June 15, 1984, and continuing with such payments on the 15th
of each month until June 15, 1996. Said deferred compensation is to
earn interest at the prime interest rate in effect at the Chase Manhattan
Bank on the second of January of each year, provided, however, that in
no event shall such interest be less than six percent (6%) or greater than
nine percent (9%).
POTENTIAL DISPUTES
1. When does interest on the deferred compensation start to ac-
crue? Obviously the team will take the position based on the contract
clause as drafted, that interest begins to accrue only after the date the
deferred compensation became payable, i.e., June 15, 1984. On the
other hand, the player will take the position that the interest should
commence to accrue when the deferred compensation is earned, i.e.,
commencing in 1977.
2. Is the interest to be paid on the deferred compensation calcu-
lated as simple interest or compound interest?
25. In re: National Football League Player's Association v. Dante Pastorini, Jr. (1984)
(Kokgel, Arb.).
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The arbitration case of Swen Nater v Los Angeles Clippers2 6 deals
with a dispute concerning the computation of interest on deferred com-
pensation. Nater had signed a seven-year contract with the Buffalo
Braves, covering the 1977-78 season through the 1983-84 season. After
the first season, Nater was traded to the San Diego (later to become the
Los Angeles) Clippers. For reasons not relevant to Nater's arbitration,
the Boston Celtics agreed to assume the Braves' obligation for the first
year of the contract (the 1977-78 season). Nater was traded to the Los
Angeles Lakers for the last season of the contract (the 1983-84 season).
A rider to Nater's National Basketball Association Uniform Player Con-
tract provided:
1. Club does hereby employ Player and Player hereby agrees to
play for the Club for a seven (7) year term, which term shall
commence as of September 1, 1977, and shall end on August
31, 1984 (each year of which shall be termed a season).
Player shall be compensated in the form of salary in the
manner following:
(a) For the 1977-78 season: $135,000
(b) For the 1978-79 season: $160,000
(c) For the 1979-80 season: $170,000
(d) For the 1980-81 season: $175,000
(e) For the 1981-82 season: $180,000
(f) For the 1982-83 season: $190,000
(g) For the 1983-84 season: $190,000
2. The salary which Player is entitled to receive in Paragraph 1
of this Rider shall be payable as follows:
(a) The first Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000) for each
season shall be paid on a current basis in twelve equal
semi-monthly payments beginning with the first of said
payment on November 1st of such season and continuing
with such payments on the first and fifteenth of each
month until the sum of $80,000 is paid in full.
(b) The balance of the salary which Player is entitled under
Paragraph 1 of the Rider shall, subject to Paragraph 2(d)
below, be deferred until June 15, 1984 over a twelve-year
period in equal monthly installments beginning with the
first of said payments on June 15, 1984 and continuing
with such payments on the fifteenth of each month until
June 15, 1996 (that is, the last monthly installment is to
be made on June 15, 1996). Said deferred compensation
26. National Basketball Player's Association; Swen Nater v. National Basketball Associa-
tion (Los Angeles Clippers), Decision 91-1 (1991) (Daniel G. Collins, Arb.).
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is to earn interest at the prime interest rate in effect at
the Chase Manhattan Bank on the second of January of
each year; provided, however, that in no event shall such
interest be less than six percent (6%) or greater than
nine percent (9%).27
Thus, the deferred compensation owed by each of the respective
teams was as follows: Celtics $55,000 plus interest; Clippers $475,000
plus interest; Lakers $120,000 plus interest. Two points of contention
developed between Nater and the Clippers, the club that had the largest
liability.
First, the Clippers interpreted the language of Section 2 of the con-
tract rider to provide for interest to be accrued only after the date that
deferred income first became payable (June 15, 1984). Nater took the
position that interest should start to accrue when the deferred compen-
sation was earned, i.e., 1977.28
Second, the Clippers took the position that the interest paid should
be "simple interest." This means that interest is paid only on the portion
of the deferred compensation that is unpaid. No interest is paid on inter-
est that has accrued but is unpaid. Conversely, Nater felt that the inter-
est should be compounded. In other words, interest should be paid on
the total amount due to Nater. This includes interest on the amount of
unpaid deferred compensation and interest on interest that has been
earned but not yet paid.29
Arbitrator Daniel Collins found that there was no intent on behalf of
the parties to compound the interest. However, Collins did find that
interest started to accrue on the deferred income at the time it was
earned. Thus, interest started to accrue in 1977.30
E. BONUS CLAUSES
1. Player shall receive a bonus of $25,000 if he leads the conference
in punt returns.
POTENTIAL DISPUTES
a. Does the term "lead the conference in punt returns" mean that
the player achieves a bonus if he leads the league in average punt re-
turns, number of punt returns or total yardage for all punt returns?
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
[Vol. 4:51
DRAFTING OF PLAYER CONTRACTS & CLAUSES
b. Should the clause contain a minimum number of punt returns to
qualify?
2. Should player lead league in tackles during the 1992 season, a
bonus will be paid in the amount of $20,000.
POTENTIAL DISPUTES
a. Does use of the term "league" mean the player's conference or
the entire league?
b. Does the player achieve the bonus if the tackles are both assisted
and unassisted?
c. Does the player achieve the bonus if he is tied with another
player?
d. Does the word "season" mean regular season or post-season?
e. When is the bonus to be paid?
3. Player shall receive a bonus of $50,000 if he gains 1,000 yards
during the season.
POTENTIAL DISPUTES
a. Presuming that the player who is to receive the bonus is a run-
ning back, does the running back achieve the 1,000 yard requirement
through rushing only and/or through receiving and/or punt returns and/
or kick-off returns?
4. Player shall receive a bonus of $25,000 if he gains 750 yards
rushing;
Player shall receive a bonus of $30,000 if he gains 900 yards
rushing;
Player shall receive a bonus of $50,000 if he gains 1,000 yards
rushing;
Player shall receive a bonus of $75,000 if he gains 1,500 yards
rushing.
POTENTIAL DISPUTES
a. These types of clauses need to qualify the bonus as either cumu-
lative or noncumulative. If the bonuses are noncumulative, the player
can collect only one (1) of the greater clauses as earned (i.e., the greatest
of the performance bonus set forth in the list of qualifying bonuses) but
is not entitled to earn more than one of the said performance bonuses.
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b. What happens if the player gains yardage that is in between the
yardage as specified in the.bonus clause? For instance, what happens if
the player gains 850 yards or 1,250 yards?
In Alan Page's (former defensive tackle for the Minnesota Vikings)
Uniform Player Contract for 1972, a clause was inserted that read, "said
player shall receive a bonus in the amount of $25,000 if he is selected
'All Pro' by the following: Associated Press, United Press International,
Pro Football Weekly or the Sporting News."31 When Page was selected
to Associated Press's second team Al-NFL squad and was chosen as one
of the two defensive tackles on the Al-NFC teams selected by United
Press International and the Sporting News, he requested payment of his
bonus from the Minnesota Vikings.32
The dispute centered upon the interpretation of "All Pro." Jim
Finks, former General Manager of the Vikings, who wrote the clause in
question, testified that All Pro signified to him that a player was selected
as the very best performer in his position in the entire league. In con-
trast, Page believed that any honorary selection, including honorable
mention, would entitle him to the bonus.33
Former National Football League Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, ruled
that "All Pro" did not have the sweeping connotation that Page ascribed
to it. However, the Vikings had specifically designated the United Press
International and The Sporting News as agencies whose selections would
determine Page's eligibility. These two agencies did not select a true
All-Pro team, but chose two All-Conference teams. Since Page was
named to the All-NFL Conference team, he was selected to the highest
honorary plateau that a player could reach under the agencies' formats.
Since the Vikings designated these agencies, Rozelle held that Page was
entitled to his bonus and ordered payment of the $25,000.34
At issue in a 1977 arbitration involving Russ Bolinger and the De-
troit Lions (94) were two incentive bonus clauses in Bolinger's 1976
contract:
Player shall receive a bonus of $3,500 if he starts seven (7)
games as an offensive player, excluding special teams, during the
1976 regular season
Player shall receive a bonus of $3,500 if he is named to the
official All-Rookie Team by either the Associated Press, United
31. In Re: Alan Page v. Minnesota Vikings (1973) (Commissioner Rozelle, Arb.)
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Press International or Newspaper Enterprise Association news
services in the 1976 season.35
Bolinger's position was that he had earned the "games-started" bo-
nus because he had started six regular season games as an offensive line-
man and a seventh regular season game, the last one of the season, as a
member of the goal-line offensive team on the first offensive play of the
game following the reception by the Lions. The Lions position was that
he had started only six regular season games as an offensive player and
that the seventh should be excluded because the goal-line offense is a
"special team. 3 6
Bolinger's position on the "All-Rookie" bonus was that he had
earned it because he was chosen to the second team of the All Rookie
Team selected by the Professional Football Writers of America. The
Lions position was that second team selection was not being named to an
official "All-Rookie Team," and in any event, Bolinger was not picked to
an All-Rookie Team by Associated Press, United Press International, or
the Newspaper Enterprise Association as specified in the bonus clause.37
After discussion, the PCRC resolved the grievance by mutual agree-
ment, as follows:
1. Bolinger is entitled to a $3,500 "games-started" bonus. He
started seven (7) regular season games as an offensive player. A
goal-ine offense may be considered a special circumstance but is
not a "special team" within the meaning of the exception to the
bonus clause. 8
The drafting of contract clauses is an area that needs both legal and
accounting assistance. For instance, what occurs if a bonus clause is not
properly drafted and the player receives an adverse arbitration decision?
Is the agent or lawyer responsible for drafting liable for negligence?
Certified agents should consult a third-party lawyer to review contract
language to make certain that the same is not subject to another inter-
pretation, uncertainty or ambiguity.
In addition, this may also be an area where an accountant might be
consulted to make certain that the contract provisions as drafted have
the proper tax effect for the player. For instance, if the player is entitled
to a signing bonus, i.e., player to receive a signing bonus of $100,000
35. NFLPA and Russ Bolinger vs Detroit Lions, PCRC Decision (1977); ROBERT C.
BERRY and GLEN M. WONG, THE LONG BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY, Vol. 1, at 248-
252.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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upon execution of the Uniform Player Contract, a qualified Certified
Public Accountant would make certain that the signing bonus is not sub-
ject to withholding tax. An accountant might suggest additional lan-
guage for the subject signing bonus clause;
A. No requirement to perform services,
B. The signing bonus is not wages subject to withholding,
C. The signing bonus is consideration for simply signing the
contract,
D. The signing bonus is not considered part of player's salary.
Finally, in deferred compensation situations, an accountant should
review the language to make certain that the player will not be subject to
the concept of constructive receipt, which could result in immediate tax-
ation without the player actually receiving the subject compensation.
Although each league's Collective Bargaining Agreement proscribes
the use of a standard form contract, other non-pre-printed contract pro-
visions are normally added to the standardized contract by an Adden-
dum or Rider which, thereafter, becomes part of the contract. For
instance, the National Basketball Association Collective Bargaining
Agreement provides that certain paragraphs of the Uniform Player Con-
tract (UPC in the following) may be modified by amendments in the
form of an Addendum or Rider thereto, which modifications are re-
ferred to in the Collective Bargaining Agreement as "Allowable
Amendments." Such amendments may include:
1. Provisions with respect to compensation (in the form of money,
property or investments to be paid to player for rendering
services.)
2. Provisions with respect to Specialized Compensation arrange-
ments such as single rooms, king size beds, personal guarantees,
bonuses, game tickets, extra promotional appearances and the
consideration therefor, automobiles, loans, stock, investment
opportunities, pension credit, and other items of value.
3. Compensation payment schedule different from that provided
for by Paragraph 2 of the UPC.
4. Provisions providing that the player's compensation is not sub-
ject to any conditions of limitations in the event such a contract
is terminated by the team or by reason of the player's lack of
skill, personal conduct, death, disability, or unfitness to play.
(GUARANTEE CLAUSES.)
5. Provisions limiting or eliminating the player's right to receive
compensation when the player's disability or unfitness to play
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skilled basketball is caused by the re-injury of an injury sus-
tained prior to, or by the aggravation of, a condition that existed
prior to the execution of the UPC.
6. By agreeing upon a provision entitling a player to receive
money, property or investment upon the sale, exchange, assign-
ment, or transfer of the UPC.
7. By agreeing upon a provision permitting the player to partici-
pate or engage in some or all of the "ultra-hazardous" activities
otherwise prohibited by Paragraph 17 of the UPC.
8. By agreeing to delete Paragraph 5(d) in its entirety in the UPC,
which states, "to be neatly and fully attired in public and always
to conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest
standards of honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship."
9. By agreeing to delete Paragraph 6(a) of the UPC in its entirety
(physical condition, unfit to play, not skilled, resulting in sus-
pension and no payment.)
10. By agreeing to delete the third sentence of Paragraph 18(a), or
the last 16 words, or the third Paragraph of 18(a) (by eliminat-
ing the consent provision for the player to participate in com-
mercial endorsements, public appearance and other uses of his
name or image for commercial purposes.)
11. After the 56th day following the first game of any scheduled
session, and solely for the purpose of replacing an injured
player, a team may enter into a player contract with another
person, which provides for compensation only for the period ac-
tually spent in the service of such team, which shall be limited to
ten days or a period encompassing three games played by such
team whichever is longer notwithstanding the provisions of Par-
agraph 20(b)(2) of the UPC. 39
Attached to the Collective Bargaining Agreement and to be used
with the Uniform Contract are Exhibits 1 through 6 which consist of
standardized language to be utilized for drafting purposes for the Allow-
able Amendments. Exhibit 1 deals with compensation, Exhibit 2 deals
with salary protection, Exhibit 3 deals with prior injury exclusion, Ex-
hibit 4 deals with assignment payments, Exhibit 5 deals with other sports
and activities, and Exhibit 6 deals with a substitute for Paragraph 6.A. It
is strongly suggested that lawyers from union and management draft
39. NATIONAL BASKETBALL AssoCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
Art.1, § 3b-3j.
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standardized rider clauses that are mutually agreeable and acceptable in
term and meaning to both parties to the contract equation. The standard
drafting clauses would be used universally by the Team, the Player and
his Agent and would be deemed to be the standardized clauses for that
particular contract provision or bonus.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we, as lawyers, owe our sports clients special duties to
make certain that their contracts truly say what was negotiated. We have
a duty to keep our clients out of the mediation or arbitration arena
through our draftsmanship. What follows are some drafting recommen-
dations that may be helpful in sports contract drafting:
1. Avoid legalese and unnecessary language.
2. Follow the dictates of the so-called plain english statutes which
require that certain documents are written in non-technical lan-
guage and in a clear and coherent manner, using words with com-
mon and everyday meanings.
3. Clearly define terms that are particular to the sport and that may
have meaning to the contracting parties by virtue of their partici-
pation in the sport but may be unclear to anybody else who may
read the language.
4. Draft with specificity and clearness any clauses that are subject to
conditions precedent or subsequent.
The object of this is to simply make certain that the team and player's
agreement is truly reflected on the page. Therefore, it is the agent-law-
yer's job to make certain that documents we draft adhere to the principle
of S.U.C.S., i.e., are characterized by Simplicity, Understanding, Clarity
and Standardization.
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